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304 CARITA'rrvo v. TEE'rs C.2d 
F. No.19603. In Bank. Nov. 
BAHT LUIS CARI'l'A'l'IVO, HAHLEY 0. 
TEETS, as ·warden of State Respondent. 
Criminal Law-Judgment-Execution of Death Penalty-San-
ity Investigation.-In view of Pen. Code, §§ 3700, 3701, declar-
that courts shall not suspend execution of a judgment of 
death and providing for a judicial proceeding to determine 
the question of defendant's present only when the 
warden of the state prison inyokes such proceeding, a writ 
of mandate will not issue to compel the warden to institute 
proceedings to determine the present sanity of a prisoner in 
his custody awaiting execution of the death penalty after the 
warden has determined that then~ is not "good reason to 
believe" such prisoner is presently insane. 
[2] !d.-Judgment--Execution of Death Penalty-Sanity Investi-
gation.-"Due process" does not prevent delegation of the 
duty of determining the sanity of a person awaiting execution 
of the death penalty to an administrative official, and judicial 
review of that officer's determination is not required. (Over-
ruling any statements in Phyle v. Duffy, :~4 CaL2d 144, 208 P.2d 
668, which imply a contrary view.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County denying petition for writ of mandate and for an order 
directing issuance of remittitur. ,Jordan L. Martinelli, Judge. 
Appeal dismissed on motion. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison 
to institute proceeding for determination of sanity of a pris-
oner under sentence of death. Appeal from denial of writ, 
dismissed; stay of execution theretofore granted, terminated. 
George T. Davis for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. 
McCOMB, .T.-This is a motion to dismiss an appeal from 
an order denying a petition for a vvrit of mandate and also 
for an order directing the issnanee of the remittitur forthwith. 
[1] Ser Cal.Jur.2d, .JudgnH'nts, § 391. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1043. 
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were of the 
three on the medical unit 
Prison at to wit, David 
R:JCJim.tuL. M.D., Chief M. M . .LUJ'""''"~-¥ M.D., 
uu::uu.;s. M.D., Chief Medical advised the 
warden relative to defendant: 
''We are he has some expansive grandiose ideas 
and feelings but no delusions or hallucinations 
are elicited and knows crime of which he was convicted 
and sentenced to execution and we are agreed he is not insane, 
albeit he has a Paranoid Personality with some Schizoid and 
some Neurotic Elements.'' 
March 1956, Dr. Willcutts, Dr. Schmidt and 
Dr.,..,.. ' all on advised the warden relative 
to defendant : 
"He shows he is oriented well in all that he has a 
memory and still some evidence of some expansive 
"u21n.uv,se ideas and of persecution. He has a Para~ 
noid Personality with some Schizoid and Neurotic elements; 
we are all that he is not '' 
May 1956, Dr. Dr. Schmidt and A. D. 
n..tnJae. M.D., all on prison staff, informed 
the warden relative to ue.LeuuaJuL 
''He knows the crime which he is sentenced, but he 
does not know, or will not say definitely where his case is in 
the courts, but feels that Mr. Davis will take good care 
of case. 
'This subject has a memory, he is oriented in all 
knows from wrong, is aware of the .crime for 
was sentenced which he faces execution. He 
exhibits some ideas and of persecution, but 
we are all he is not insane. He has a paranoid 
Pel~sonal.ItJ' with schizoid and neurotic elements.'' 
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IX. On Dr. Schmidt and Dr. 
Kopac advised the warden defendant: 
''This subject has a good memory, is oriented in all spheres. 
He knows right from wrong and is aware of the crime for 
which he was sentenced and for which he faces execution. 
He exhibits many ideas and of persecution; 
but we are all agreed that he is not insane. He has 
a Paranoid Personality with many Schizoid and Neurotic 
Elements.'' 
The record fails to disclose any evidence the 
findings of the doctors as set forth above. 
x. On .August 30, 1956, defendant filed a petition for a writ 
of mandate in the Superior Court of Marin County seeking 
to compel the warden of San Quentin penitentiary to institute 
proceedings to determine the present sanity of defendant. 
The writ was denied by the superior court on the same elate 
and a notice of appeal immediately filed with this court. On 
August 31, 1956, a stay of execution pending the appeal from 
the order denying the petition for a writ of mandate was 
granted. 
[1] This is the sole question ueeessary for us to determine: 
In view of the provisions of sections 3'700 and 370P of the 
Penal Code, will a writ of mandate 1"ssue to compel the warden 
of the state pen·itentiary to institute proceedings to determine 
the present sanity of a prisoner in his custody awaiting 
execution of the death penalty after the warden has deter-
mined that there is not "good reason to believe" such pr,isoner 
is presently insane? 
No. The method of determining the question of the sanity 
of a person awaiting execution is controlled by the Legis-
lature. 
'Section 3700 of the Penal Code reads: "No judge, court, or officer, 
other than the Governor, can suspend the execution of a judgment 
of death, except the warden of the State prison to whom he is 
delivered for execution, as provided in the six succeeding sections, 
unless an appeal is taken." 
Section 3701 of the Penal Code reads: "If, after his delivery to the 
warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant, 
under judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call 
such fact to the attention of the district attorney of the county in 
which the prison is situated, whose duty it is to immediately file in the 
superior court of such county a petition, stating the conviction and 
judgment, and the fact that the defendant is believed to be insane, 
and asking that the question of his sanity be inquired into. 'rhereupon 
the court must at once cause to be summoned and impaneled, from the 
regular jury list of the county, a jury of 12 persons to hmt.r such 
inquiry." 
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in Penal Code section 3700 
the execution of a judgment 
in section 3701 of the Penal 
to determine the question of 
only when the warden invokes such 
30 Cal.2d 838 at 843 [2] [186 
It is settled that "due ' does not prevent 
of the duty of determining the sanity of a person 
awaiting execution of the death penalty to an administrative 
official, and judicial review of that officer's determination is 
not required. ("tlcCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal.2d 648 at 653 [7] 
P.2d 561]2; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 [70 S.Ct. 
457 at 459 , 94 J_~.Ed. 604] ; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 
398 at 405 et seq. [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515] .) 
Any statements in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 CaL2d 144 [208 P.2d 
668], which imply a contrary view are overruled. 
For the reasons above stated the motion to dismiss the 
appeal is granted and the stay of execution heretofore granted 
is terminated. r~et the remittitur issue forthwith. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment and, generally, 
in the discussion insofar as it relates to petitioner's claimed 
right to judicial review of the administrative act of the 
warden. (lVIandamus is not a proper vehicle for asserting 
the right here involved. See concurring and dissenting opin-
ion, Phyle v. Duffy (1949), 34 Cal.2d 144, 170 [208 P.2d 668] .) 
I do not, however, concur in any possible implication that 
an insane person may be executed or that the right to the 
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended or denied absolutely 
as to persons who are insane or who are under sentence of 
death, merely because they have been so adjudicated. 
'Justice Schauer, speaking :for this court, with whom Chief Justice 
Gibson and Justices Shenk and Edmonds concurred, said in the cited 
case at page 653 [7]: "Petitioner asserts that he is denied due process 
o:f law i:f he is not accorded judicial review o:f the question whether 
there is good reason to believe that he has become insane. It has been 
held that :federal due process accords him no such right. (Citation.)" 
On page 654 o:f the same case, Justice Traynor, with whom Justice 
Spence concurred, said: "Procedural due process does not prevent 
delegation o:f the duty o:f determining the sanity o:f a person under 
judgment o:f death to an administrative official and does not require 
judicial review o:f that official's determination. (Citations.)" 
''Three. 
'!'he Constitution of 
that "The 
shall not be 




may it.'' The Constitution 
deelares the same fundamental 
The Penal Code, section 1473, implementing the Constitu-
tion, declares that "Every person unlawfully imprisoned or 
restrained of his liberty, under any may 
prosecute a ·writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause 
of such imprisonment or restraint." Section 1474 provides 
that the petition for the writ (which may be signed either 
by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some person 
in his behalf) shall specify "If the imprisonment is alleged 
to be illegal ... in what the alleged illegality consists.'' 
The illegality may consist in the fact that a warden of a 
prison refuses to obey the law: a prisoner is insane, is known 
to the warden to be insane, and is nevertheless being held by 
the warden for the purpose of executing a sentence of death 
while the prisoner remains insane. In such a case the order 
granting the writ of habeas corpus vvould not require the 
release of the prisoner from all custody (Pen. Code, § 1486) 
but should release him from the illegal detention; i. e., the 
detention which, if not limited, will culminate in illegal execu-
tion and, if the prisoner in the of the super-
intendent of a hospital for the criminal insane for safekeeping 
and treatment rather than in the custody of the warden of a 
state prison for execution, the writ may so order (Pen. Code, 
§§ 1487, subd. 5, 1493). 
Section 3700 of the Penal Code, providing that "No judge, 
court, or officer, other than the Governor, can suspend the 
execution of a judgment of death, except the warden of the 
State prison to whom he is delivered for execution, as provided 
in the six succeeding sections, unless an appeal is taken," by 
its own provision has no application to the powers of the 
court or a judge when an appeal has been taken and manifestly 
it cannot, by express prohibition of the Constitutions of both 
the 
CARITATIVO 'rEETS 
[47 C.2d 304; 303 P.2d 339] 
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operate to 
of the citizens to 
writs of habeas 
of execution as may be appropriate. 
issue a writ of habeas corpus in a 
the power execution. The 
issuance of the writ must as a necessary incident effect 
the writ has been or an appro-
else the writ could not be obeyed. Sections 
be construed, as their own 
of the dnties of a warden 
when "there is good reason to believe that a defend-
under judgment of death, has become insane," or "that 
a female . . . like commitment] is pregnant." ( Cer-
tain duties are also imposed upon the district attorney by 
the mentioned sections in the contemplated circumstances.) 
But sueh sections do not ptwport to cover the situation where 
the warden fails to obey the law. 
Certainly no provision in chapter 2 (of tit. 3, pt. 3) of the 
Penal Code (the chapter containing sections 3700 to 3706, 
inelusive) purports to declare that the warden of a prison 
is above the law and his acts beyond cognizance of the courts. 
Neither does any provision of law purport to authorize the 
execution of an insane person or a pregnant woman, or to 
suspend, in contravention of the Constitutions of the United 
States and of the State of California, the issuance of writs of 
habeas corpus or the inherent power of the court, or a justice 
in such cases to stay execution. 
The constitutional provisions safeguarding the writ of 
habeas corpus ad snbjicienclum are wise. The right to that 
writ was hard won by our ancestors. It gained formal recog-
nition as the vehicle for inquiring into the lawfulness of the 
restraint of a person detained in another's custody upon 
passage of the Petition of Right (16 Ohas. I, ch. 10, § 8) and 
the subsequent passage iu 1679 of the Habeas Corpus Act 
Chas. II, ch. It should not be stricken down in 
whole or whittled away in part by any decision of this court. 
To hold it inapplicable in the case of prisoners under sentence 
of death who are insane, or who are pregnant, would mean 
that, conceivably, a warden, knowing full well that a prisoner 
was a lunatic, completely bereft of reason, unknowing the 
act for which he was sentenced or even that he was to be 
punished, could proceed with the execution. Likewise, such 
a warden, knowing that a female under death sentence was 
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about to be delivered of could proceed with the execution 
of the convicted prisoner as an incident thereof, of the 
unborn infant. And, the writ of habeas eorpus being sus-
pended in such cases, no court or judge eould stay the 
execution. (See majority in In re Phyle (1947), 30 
Cal.2d 838, 850 P.2d ; see also opinion, 
id., 851 et seq.; see and opinion, Phyle v. 
Duffy (1949), supra, 34 OaL2d 144, 163 et seq. Phyle v. 
Duffy (1948 , 334 U.S. 431 S.Ct. 92 L.Ed. 1494], 
concurring opinion of Mr. ;rusti(:e pp. 444-445 
of 334 U.S.) 
The concept of mandamus superior eourt civil 
proceeding carrying with it a right to appeal and ensuing 
delay) as a substitute for habeas corpus was an unfortunate 
expedient which had better never have been innovated. (See 
In re Phyle (1947), S1tpra; Phyle v. D1tj]y (1948), S1LpTa, 334 
U.S. 431; Phyle v. Duffy (1949), supra, 34 Cal.2d 144, 147, 
167, 171.) I am glad to concur in holding that such remedy 
is inapplicable. 
There should be few, if any, unjustified delays attendant 
upon use of the conventional vehicle, habeas corpus, upon 
proper showings. 'fhis court will not issue such writ upon 
tardy application or the mere averment of conclusions, or of 
the ultimate fact, or of general statements of facts. The 
principles enunciated in In re Swa·in (1949), 34 Cal.2d 300, 
304 [209 P.2d 793], should be strictly applied in all related 
situations. (See also People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 
506 [197 P.2c1330].) 
For the reasons, and with the limitations, above stated, I 
concur in the orders dismissing the appeal, terminating the 
stay of execution and issuing the remittitur forthwith. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-~Because it is 
and always has been my view that mandamus is not available 
to determine the sanity of a person under sentence of death 
and that habeas corpus is the only remedy available to such 
a person, I concur in the order for the dismissal of the 
appeaL I dissent from the holding in the majority opinion 
that there can be no judicial review of the determination of 
the warden as to the sanity of a person under sentence of 
death as it is my opinion that habeas corpus is available to 
review such a determination. (See concurring and dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 
144 [208 P.2d 668], and my dissent in McCracken v. Teets, 
311 
. ) I agree with the views 
Mr. Justice Schauer in his opmwn 
in the case at bar with to the availability of the writ 
of habeas eorpus m a case such as this, and on the record 
before us, such should be available to the petitioner 
here. 
No. 5795. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1956.] 
'l'HE PEOPLE, Hesponclent, v. LEONARD LYONS, 
Appellant. 
Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Asking Improper Ques-
tions.-\Vhere defendant has not yet testified as a witness, it 
is improper for the prosecuting attorney on cross-examination 
of defendant's wife to allude to a prior conviction of defendant 
under another name. 
[2] Lewdness-Evidence-Complaint.-Courts look with disfavor 
on a complaint made long after the event on which a charge 
of lewd conduct with a child is based. 
[3] Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.-
Generally, if the harmful effect of improper statements of the 
prosecuting attorney could probably be removed by an admoni-
tion to the jury, failure to request such admonition waives the 
right to rely on the statements as misconduct. 
[4] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-Where mis-
conduct of the prosecuting attorney is of such a character that 
it cannot be purged of its harmful effect by an admonition, it 
will be considered as a possible ground for reversal in cases 
in which the jury has been admonished, as well as in cases 
in which no objection was made or admonition requested. 
[5] !d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Where the case is closely balanced and guilt is not 
so clearly established as to render it improbable that the 
harmful effect of misconduct by the prosecuting attorney may 
have turned the scales against the accused, such misconduct is 
ground for reversal. 
[1] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 459. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 610; [2] Lewdness, 
§ 16; Criminal Law, § 1096; [4] Criminal Law, § 1105; [5] 
Criminal Law,§ 1403; [6] Criminal Law,§ 587; [7] Criminal Law, 
§ 104; [8] Criminal Law, ~ 1341(2); [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 1322 
(1); [11] Criminal Law,§ 1324(1); [12, 14] Lewdness, § 19; [13] 
Lewdness, § 21. 
